What Odisha Loses When Its Graduates Leave

Odisha has one of India's most serious talent drain problems, and one of the least-discussed ones.

The pattern is well-established in anecdote — every Odia family in Bhubaneswar has cousins in Bengaluru, a sibling in Hyderabad, a child in Pune. What's less discussed is the economic logic that produces this pattern, the scale of what the state loses, and what would actually need to change for the outflow to slow.

The education-export pipeline

Odisha has built substantial higher education infrastructure over the past two decades. The state has more than 800 degree colleges, several central universities and IITs, KIIT and ITER in Bhubaneswar (which together graduate tens of thousands of engineers annually), NIT Rourkela (one of the country's top technical institutions), and a growing medical education sector. The quality of graduates from these institutions ranges from strong to excellent.

The state also has public schools, Eklavya schools for tribal students, Navodaya schools, and significant central and state investment in primary and secondary education. The inputs into the education pipeline are real, substantial, and have been increasing.

What happens when people come out the other end of that pipeline is the problem.

A software engineering graduate from KIIT faces a clear choice. In Bhubaneswar, an entry-level role at an IT services company might pay ₹3.5-5 lakh per year. The same skills in Hyderabad — where the concentration of tech companies means more options and faster bidding-up of salaries — might start at ₹6-9 lakh and compound faster. That's not a marginal difference. Over a five-year career trajectory, the gap is so large that staying in Bhubaneswar requires either non-economic attachments to place (family, preference for cost of living, networks) or a strong belief that the opportunity trajectory will converge.

At 22, most people don't have strong non-economic attachments to place. And the opportunity trajectories haven't converged. So they leave.

Migration is rational at the individual level; catastrophic at the aggregate

This is the central tension in Odisha's talent drain, and it is important to name it clearly.

The decision to leave Odisha for Bengaluru or Hyderabad is, for the individual making it, almost always rational. Better salary. Better career options. Better hospitals and schools for eventual children. A larger network of people in similar professions. The only irrational part of leaving is the emotional cost — separation from family, language, food, the specific texture of life in a place you know.

But aggregate rational individual decisions can produce collectively damaging outcomes. When the best-educated fraction of every cohort leaves, the institutions that would become competitive employers in Odisha lose the people who would make them competitive. The companies that might anchor a local tech cluster can't grow because they can't retain people past two years. The hospitals that might specialize get stripped of specialist doctors who go where the patients with money are. The schools that might improve get their best teachers recruited away.

This is not a cycle that infrastructure alone can break. You can build a road and a power line to Bhawanipatna. The road and the power line will not keep a data scientist there if the nearest employer who needs a data scientist is in Hyderabad.

What the numbers show — and where they have limits

Precise state-level data on Odisha's skilled outmigration is thinner than the phenomenon deserves. National migration surveys — the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) and earlier National Sample Survey rounds — consistently show Odisha among India's highest out-migration states, alongside Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Jharkhand.

But those surveys capture all migration, including seasonal agricultural migration from districts like Bolangir, Nuapada, and Bargarh, where tens of thousands of workers travel to Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh for agricultural labor every year. This seasonal migration is significant and should be tracked — but it's a different phenomenon from permanent skilled emigration.

What's harder to quantify separately is the graduate migration. The state doesn't publish systematic data on where its engineering and professional graduates are employed three years after graduation. NIT Rourkela's placement data suggests the large majority of its graduates take roles outside Odisha. KIIT and ITER, closer to the Bhubaneswar economy, retain more locally — but "locally" often means roles with companies headquartered in Bengaluru that have a Bhubaneswar delivery center.

An honest assessment: I don't have a precise figure for Odisha's annual skilled graduate outflow, and I'm skeptical of anyone who claims they do. The data isn't collected systematically. What I do have is the structural logic that explains why the outflow is large, the qualitative evidence from every district I know, and the macroeconomic indicator that Odisha's per capita income — despite consistent SGDP growth — remains substantially below the national average and far below states with comparable endowments like Karnataka.

The remittance inversion

Here is the perverse result of Odisha's talent drain: the state's rural economy has become partially dependent on remittances from people who left.

Remittances — money sent home by Odiyas working in other states — are a significant household income source, particularly in western and southern districts. In parts of Bolangir, Nuapada, and Kalahandi, the cash income that flows into villages from migrant workers is materially important to household consumption and investment decisions.

This is not development. It is evidence of development failure that has been adapted to by households in the most rational way available to them. When a state's economic structure forces its people to become an export commodity — exporting labor to be processed into income elsewhere and remitted back — that is not a feature. It is an accurate description of a broken relationship between the state's endowments and its economic structure.

The remittance economy is sustainable until it isn't. The generation that remits today is the generation that stays in the destination city permanently tomorrow. Their children grow up in Bengaluru. The remittance flow declines. The households that depended on it face a gap that the local economy still cannot fill.

What Bhubaneswar's partial success shows

Bhubaneswar has done something real. The IT cluster anchored by KIIT/ITER and expanded by Infosys, TCS, and a growing ecosystem of mid-size tech companies has retained a proportion of Odisha's tech graduates that would not have stayed fifteen years ago. The city's cost of living — significantly lower than Bengaluru or Hyderabad — makes a modest salary differential tolerable for people who want to stay near family.

This is the proof of concept that talent retention is possible under the right conditions. It is also evidence of how narrow those conditions currently are. The conditions that exist in Bhubaneswar — a critical mass of employers, a campus culture producing graduates in volume, improved connectivity — do not exist in Sambalpur, Berhampur, Rourkela, or Cuttack to anything like the same degree, let alone in Bhawanipatna or Koraput.

The Bhubaneswar model is not easily exportable to secondary cities without the same fundamental conditions: an anchor employer that creates a visible career path, a cluster effect that makes professional networking viable, and wages that close enough of the Bengaluru gap to make the non-economic advantages of staying worth accepting.

The policy question

Odisha has invested heavily in education inputs. It has invested much less in creating the conditions for those inputs to produce local economic output.

The gap between what Odisha puts into education and what it captures from that investment in terms of local economic activity is the functional definition of its talent drain problem. Closing that gap requires private sector employers willing to locate and grow in Odisha at wages competitive with metro alternatives — which requires either large subsidies, genuine agglomeration advantages, or enough critical mass to become self-reinforcing.

None of those conditions emerge automatically from infrastructure spending. They require deliberate industrial policy, sustained over a decade, with a specific theory of which industries can become competitive in Odisha and why.

The state has the natural resource endowments, the port infrastructure, the young population, and now the connectivity to make a serious attempt. What it hasn't had is a coherent theory of which knowledge-economy industries it could realistically anchor, and a policy aligned to that theory rather than to the easier-to-measure infrastructure metrics.

The talent is here. The people are here, educated and capable. The problem is that the systems that would keep them here are not yet built.

Manas Majhi is the founder of Majhi Group and Majhi OS. He grew up in Junagarh, Kalahandi. Data cited: PLFS (Periodic Labour Force Survey), Economic Survey of Odisha, KIIT/ITER placement data, NITI Aayog State Statistics.